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INTRODUCTIONS
LAW IN THE WORK OF
FÉLIX GONZÁLEZ-TORRES
Eduardo M. Peñalver*
and Sergio Muñoz Sarmiento**
Within contemporary art, it is well known that Félix GonzálezTorres created elegant, sparse and poetic art works. Through his use of
diverse media—photography, drawing, and sculpture (created by using
unusual materials such as candy, stacks of paper, or battery operated
clocks) González-Torres’ merged the personal and the political; the conceptual and the aesthetic. These aspects of his work have been thoroughly explored by artists, scholars, and collectors alike.
What observers have not examined nearly as fully are the many
ways that Félix González-Torres’s art referenced, utilized and challenged
legal tools and doctrines in part by complicating the notion and definition
of the art object itself. By merging minimal-conceptual art strategies with
legal devices, González-Torres’ art works upset and expand our understanding of what constitutes the art object, the ownership, exhibition and
dissemination of art, and the public’s relationship to art and art
institutions.
Certain art historians are skeptical of conceptual artists’ use of law
and legal instruments. For example, in his book, Conceptual Art and the
Politics of Publicity, Alexander Alberro laments that Seth Siegelaub and
Robert Projansky’s artists’ contract of 1971, better known as The Artist’s
Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale Agreement, did nothing more than
facilitate the commodification of ideas. It is quite possible that this skepticism and criticism is based on a superficial understanding of legal doctrines and philosophical jurisprudence. No stranger to the hermetic and
the obtuse, the law does not lend itself to facile consumption and understanding of its historical-philosophical origins, let alone its practical applications, by other disciplines.
Félix González-Torres counters this type of cursory approach. An
avid reader of literature, art history and semiotic theory, González-Torres
* Allan R. Tessler Dean and Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
** Sergio Muñoz Sarmiento is an art lawyer. In 2010 he founded The Art & Law Program from a semester-long seminar series with a theoretical and philosophical focus on the
effects of law and jurisprudence on cultural production and reception.
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was well aware of the complexities, power and politics of language. With
his art world success, González-Torres became increasingly aware of
how legal language could be used to further not only an artist’s political
beliefs, but also his artistic intentions. Given González-Torres’ role as a
critically engaged artist and educator, one could argue that GonzálezTorres was aware of other artists who were already employing the written contract to further artists’ rights. By his time, artists such as Hans
Haacke, Michael Asher, Tehching Hsieh and Adrian Piper were either
familiar with or using Seth Siegelaub and Robert Projansky’s artist’s
contract mentioned above. It is very likely that González-Torres studied
Siegelaub and Projansky’s contract and found in it a platform, a boilerplate, for guaranteeing that his artistic wishes and intentions would be
reliably secured. For González-Torres, the legal tool that could most
closely enforce his wishes took the form of what is known as a certificate
of authenticity.
The fact that little critical attention has been given to the role law
and legal instruments played in conceptual art and post-conceptual art
practices is precisely why this symposium volume exists: to counter the
reticence—one can even say fear—of many art historians and critics (not
to mention legal scholars interested in art) to acknowledge the critical
and unsettling role that law and legal jurisprudence has had in art of the
twentieth and twenty first centuries.
The papers published here attempt to counter this reticence and fear.
They also memorialize the spoken word. The six papers and photographic artwork are the fruit of a gathering, Poetic Justice: On the Intersection of Art and Law in the Work of Félix González-Torres, which took
place on February 11, 2016 at the de la Cruz Collection in Miami, Florida. That event brought together scholars with backgrounds in law, art
history and cultural history, as well as collectors and contemporary artists to analyze the work of Félix González-Torres and its impact on the
worlds of art and law. The symposium was organized by Cornell Law
School; the Art & Law Program; and the de la Cruz Collection.
The artist as infiltrator was, for Félix González-Torres, a key
performative role. Having grown up in Fidel Castro’s Cuba, and—
later—having participated in collaborative political groups such as
Group Material, González-Torres expressed skepticism of revolution and
direct political action. As he once put it: “I don’t want a revolution anymore, it’s too much energy for too little.”
In his essay for this volume, Félix González-Torres’ Epistemic Art,
Robert Hobbs explores this tension between innovation and pragmatism
within González-Torres’s work. Hobbs provides a thoughtful overview
of González-Torres’s art after his departure from Group Material. Focusing more on the artist’s intimate relationship to the viewing audience and
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the collector, Hobbs explains how González-Torres appropriated American history and its language in order to unveil the subtle-yet-political
constructions of sex and gender. Similar to how a lawyer employs
performative tactics to bend and manipulate legal systems and adversarial interactions, González-Torres appropriated the language of the art
market and legal system in order to guarantee that the relevance of his art
works and ideas were well secured.
At the center of Félix González-Torres’s infiltration of law is the
aforementioned “Certificate of Authenticity.” As Joan Kee discusses in
her contribution to this volume, these certificates operate simultaneously
as proof of authenticity of the work of art, as evidence of ownership of
the work, and as a set of instructions that describe the work and provide
more or less detailed “instructions for installation.” Later versions of the
certificates identified themselves as “agreements,” and were signed by
the artist, the gallery, and the owner of the work. Two examples of certificates of authenticity are included in the appendix to this issue.
Consistent with the notion of González-Torres as an “infiltrator,”
the significance of his work is not limited to the contributions he made to
the tradition of Conceptual art. For both the lawyer interested in art and
for the artist interested in law, Félix González-Torres’s work, and his
invocation of legal tropes (like contracts), generate intriguing puzzles
that offer to challenge and illuminate issues at the boundaries of both art
and law. In the essays that make up this special issue, a number of interesting questions arise on more than one occasion.
The first is the identity and nature of the work. Consider the work,
“Untitled” (Portrait of Dad) (1991), whose certificate of authenticity is
included in the appendix. According to the certificate, the piece consists
of “white candies, individually wrapped in clear cellophane. The ideal
weight is 175 lbs. In the original and ideal manifestation of the work the
candies were poured directly on the floor where two walls meet to create
a pile in the corner.” Is this work of art the particular candies that sit in
the gallery at any given moment? This is certainly possible, although
unstable and perhaps superficial. After all, that physical manifestation of
the artist’s vision is constantly changing as observers of the work take
pieces away from it and as the curator replenishes it. Is the work the
certificate of authenticity? Possibly, but the certificate itself seems implicitly to deny this when it points towards the expression of the artist’s
vision in the world through its description and instructions for display. Is
the work the vision—the idea—itself, as Joan Kee suggests in her essay?
Are the physical objects—the individual candies or the pile of candy—
merely visible (and ephemeral) materializations of the underlying work?
This is certainly another possibility. Each of these attempts to define the
“work” raises new questions of its own.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\26-3\CJP301.txt

452

CORNELL JOURNAL

unknown

OF

LAW

AND

Seq: 4

PUBLIC POLICY

5-MAY-17

10:06

[Vol. 26:449

One important set of questions revolves about what it means to own
such a work. For the collector, the identity of the work has a great deal
of significance for a number of reasons. Perhaps most obviously, it is
likely to have some bearing on the marketability and long-term value of
the work. Imagine, for example, that the work described above were
simply a particular pile of candies that, once consumed by observers, was
gone? Who would pay a significant sum of money for such an ephemeral asset? González-Torres’s candy piles have sold for millions of dollars, which suggests that collectors understand the work to be something
other than the particular candies on display at any given time.1 At the
other extreme of abstraction, if the work is identified as the idea described in the certificate of authenticity, the legal enforceability of that
claim within the law governing intellectual property might make it impossible for the “owner” of the work to exclude others from appropriating it. If the certificate is the work, it may trigger a host of legal
questions around the status of that certificate—as property, contract or
both. If the work is the certificate, understanding that certificate as property (or contract) might make the work more (or less) alienable and
therefore more (or less) attractive as an object of ownership. On the
other hand, as Kee observes, González-Torres viewed the certificate as
reflecting an ongoing relationship between the artist and the owner of the
work. This aspiration finds some confirmation in the contribution by
Carlos and Rosa de la Cruz, who plainly enjoyed a relationship of deep
intimacy with González-Torres. That intimacy—which could not be
alienated—both informs and gives meaning to their ownership of his
work, and continues to inform their curation of the González-Torres’s
pieces in their collection.
Finally, the work of González-Torres raises legal questions whose
significance extends beyond the circle of those immediately involved in
the transactions over his work. Are there lessons that legal theorists can
draw from his work about the concept of “property” and the notion of the
“contract”? In their contributions to this issue, Gregory Alexander and
Joan Kee suggest that possibility. More concretely, identification of the
work with the certificate of authenticity, for example, might problematize the status of the collector as an “owner” because of the restrictions
placed on the collector’s rights with regard to the work by the artist
through the certificate. This is particularly the case if the law views the
certificate through a contractual lens. As with software and music, perhaps under certain circumstances, it is more appropriate to think of the
1 In 2010, “Untitled” (Portrait of Marcel Brient) (1997), sold at auction for $4.5 million. The piece consists of roughly 200 pounds of blue candy piled in a corner. See Kyle
Chayka, Candy Sells for $4.5 Million at Philips de Pury Auction, Hyperallergic.com (Nov. 9,
2010), http://hyperallergic.com/12202/candy-sells-philips-de-pury/.
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collector of González-Torres works as a mere licensee. But perhaps our
notion of ownership needs to be broad enough to encompass such limitations. Some scholars have argued for treating ownership of significant
artwork as a kind of trusteeship imbued with significant duties to the
public.2 If this is the case, can the constrained prerogatives of GonzálezTorres’ collectors shed light on the duties of collectors of other works of
art not subject to certificates of authenticity? Do owners of art works—
both private and public entities—have any moral or legal obligations to
the general public when it comes to exhibiting, owning and deaccessioning art works? And do these constraints on owners shed light on the
notion of ownership more broadly or are they only operative within the
discrete world of art?
The law of intellectual property is also implicated by an understanding of González-Torres’s works, distilled to their essence, as pure ideas.
While González-Torres (following other conceptual artists) seemed to
view this claim as modest and democratic in its material parsimony, to
the intellectual property lawyer, the claim to own an idea (as opposed to
the expression or physical manifestation of an idea) is maximalist in the
extreme. One who claims to “own” an idea as a work of art claims a
right to fence off a domain of human thought, ostensibly free from the
limitations (e.g., on duration and scope) built into the law of intellectual
property. These fascinating and important legal questions form the preoccupation of several of the pieces that follow.
In his essay, Objects of Art; Objects of Property, Gregory S. Alexander deploys González-Torres’s art to pose a challenge to an influential
theoretical approach to the question of “property.” Under this approach,
the institution of property exists in order to facilitate the organization of
human activity with respect to scarce resources by clearly allocating
rights with respect to those resources in ways that are more easily legible
to participants in a legal system than would be the case with a highly
customized allocation of individual rights. By attaching property rights
to lumpy “things,” the law of property reduces the information processing costs that go along with allocating private rights over scarce resources. All non-owners need to know in order to navigate through a
world of private rights is whether they own a particular “thing” they encounter. If they do not, the law’s message to them (on this view) is very
simple: “keep off or don’t touch.”3
In elaborating this approach, Harvard Law School professor Henry
E. Smith has dubbed property law as the “Law of Things.” As Smith puts
it:
2
3

See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt (2001).
Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1691, 1693 (2012).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\26-3\CJP301.txt

454

CORNELL JOURNAL

unknown

OF

LAW

AND

Seq: 6

PUBLIC POLICY

5-MAY-17

10:06

[Vol. 26:449

Property is a shortcut over the “complete” property system that would, in limitlessly tailored fashion, specify all
the rights, duties, privileges, and so forth, holding between persons with respect to the most fine-grained uses
of the most articulated attributes of resources. Property
starts by taking advantage of the fact that some connections among people, uses, and attributes of things are
more important than others. Property organizes this
world into lumpy packages of legal relations—legal
things—by setting boundaries around useful attributes
that tend to be strong complements.4
Alexander argues that the questionable “thingness” in González-Torres’
paper stacks contains valuable lessons for property theorists. Gonzalez
Torres’s intentional and playful obfuscation of the “thing” that constitutes an individual work of art suggests the need for a theory of things in
order to get Smith’s theory off the ground. Alexander contends that,
pace Smith, “thing-ness is ambiguous, neither easily affirmed nor denied.
In one sense they are stable, for, assuming the public or whomever is
responsible does its part by replenishing the supply of paper, the stacks
remain. Yet in another sense these works are quite unstable. Their very
existence depends upon the cooperation of someone other than the artist.” With the stack’s shifting height, disappearance and replenishment, at
what point can we say that the stack of paper is the stack of paper?
Keeping in mind that the stack diminishes as every viewer takes, free of
charge, a piece of paper or two, at what point can we say that the artwork
is a “thing,” if it is even a thing at all?
For Alexander, the question of what is the “thing” in many of González-Torres’ artworks is complicated by González-Torres’ invocation of
the public and private divide. The museum’s care—in fact, its duty—to
replenish candy and paper is juxtaposed with González-Torres’ invitation
of the public to interact with the art works; to negotiate a space of giveand-take. For Alexander, both the museum’s and the public’s role vis-àvis González-Torres’ work highlights another key factor within theories
of property: that of responsibility. While some might view this invocation of duty as antithetical to ownership—and therefore suggestive of
another kind of relationship between artist and collector—for Alexander,
property as an institution is always a blend of rights and duties; prerogatives and responsibilities.
Joan Kee’s Félix González-Torres on Contracts takes a more poetic
and philosophical approach to the written agreement, arguing that for
González-Torres the certificate of authenticity, i.e., the contract, was not
4

Id.
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FÉLIX GONZÁLEZ-TORRES

10:06

455

just an instrument of private law, but also a work on paper that documented his ongoing and perpetual relationship to the individual, (the collector), and to the general public (the art museum). For Kee, GonzálezTorres’ use of the contract was guided, to many a contract scholar’s chagrin, by ambiguity and trust. Through his use of suggestive language,
González-Torres aimed at leaving narrow-yet-ample room for interpretation on behalf of the collecting entity. The collector or curator could
make certain choices as to the display, care and conservation of the work,
but so long as those choices remained within the purview of GonzálezTorres’ contract.
The concepts of thingness and responsibility are extended by Sonia
K. Katyal in her analysis of the public good in González-Torres’ art
works. In her essay, The Public Good in Poetic Justice, Katyal urges us
to understand property not only as a thing, but rather as a collective experience: a collective experience that is inherently a political act. Katyal
proposes that we interpret “public good” through González-Torres’ work
in three ways: first, by noting how González-Torres’ work questioned
notions of a singular intellectual property; second, by engaging his art in
a philosophical and utopian sense; and third, by recognizing how the
public good “personifies” González-Torres’ legacy. In effect, Katyal
adds to the beauty and complexity in González-Torres’ work by not only
broadening the interpretations of his work, but also, and quite poetically,
humanizing our understanding and application of law.
But, lest we get too comfortable with the beauties of public participation, Martha Buskirk reminds us that just as there is a good in the
public, there is the potential for public wrongs. In her essay, Public Experience/Private Authority, Buskirk notes that most post-studio art
works5 must be read through the rise in the use of private documents, in
particular, certificates. Given that most post-studio art allowed for purchasers and collectors to assemble and display such art works in multiple
formats, post-studio artists were faced with challenges as to the proper
display of their art works and, more problematically, whether it was the
artist or the collector who should ultimately decide the art work’s fate.
For Buskirk, the use of certificates profoundly changed art making in the
latter half of the twentieth century, for not only did certificates address
an artist’s demands concerning the exhibition and dissemination of their
art works, they also helped launch, propel and strengthen artists’ rights.
González-Torres’ interest in play, proliferation and randomness is
echoed by artist Jim Hodges’s photographic contribution to this collection. Inserted between pages of each journal, in random fashion, is a
5 Post-studio art works are idea and research based art projects, not necessarily always
objects, that are generally created on-site and/or through industrial means of production. The
use of found and ready-made objects is also quite common.
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photograph with a back label that reads, “framing the possibles . . . the
table top studio of FGT, (date and photographer unknown) JH 2016.”
For this volume, Hodges produced a limited number of these photographs, three hundred copies to be exact, mirroring the general print-run
of the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy.
The limited number of photographs mirrors the limitations in and of
González-Torres’ work. With González-Torres’, the price of his art
works limit who can actually “own” them, i.e.- the certificate of authenticity to a particular art work. However, Hodges’s limited edition photograph for this journal is physically limited—only the lucky ones that
obtain one of the three hundred copies of this journal will “own” a Jim
Hodges art work.6 But perhaps not all of González-Torres’ works, at
least those governed by a certificate of authenticity, were to be “owned”
only by those interested in González-Torres’ art work as a commodity.
As noted above, the answer to what constitutes “the work” is obscured
by the multiple linguistic, legal and artistic parameters engaged by González-Torres. For those interested in the poetic aspects of “the work,” the
candies and posters are the work. For those interested in financial speculation and asset accumulation, the certificate of authenticity is the work.
And, still, for those focused on the complex concepts of and to GonzálezTorres’ work, the idea is the work. Here, Conceptual art comes full-circle—from art as idea to idea as commodity, back to the idea as art.
And what of the image captured by an unknown photographer, with
date also unknown? A photograph that frames an image of four unknown
individuals, the residue of, presumably, a dinner or late night drinks (a
game of poker, perhaps), and plastic figurines of Sylvester the Cat and
Santa Claus. But why exclude the faces of the individuals? Why focus on
the back-side of a pop-culture plastic figurine that points to our right with
his index finger? Why are the faces of all figures within the frame obscured? How many individuals are in the room, and what are they discussing and doing? By posing these questions, Hodges poetically
compares the framing in photography to the act of framing within the
law. Do we read only within the frame, or do we expand our reading
outside of the four corners? And what governs our methodology, our
sources, and to what extent?
As every first-year law student quickly realizes, the pleasure to be
gleaned from the law resides not in the answer (for there is none), but
rather in the rabbit hole maze created by the temporary postulation, “it
depends.” Like many first-year law classes, Félix González-Torres’ art
works are, fundamentally, Socratic. Does González-Torres’ art work further conceptual art or perpetuate the commodification of culture? Do his
6 It is unclear whether Jim Hodges considers his limited edition photograph for this
journal an artwork. Does it matter?
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collectors and agents guarantee his relevance within the canon of contemporary art or do they, instead, facilitate and perpetuate financial speculation in art? Is his artwork memorialized at the expense of its
ephemerality and transience? And perhaps more importantly, are the discourses of art and law to be merged and overlapped? It depends.
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